De-Fragmenting Modernity - A Review

Paul Tyson’s 2017 book, De-fragmenting Modernity: Reintegrating Knowledge with Wisdom, Belief with Truth, and Reality with Being, is a place for those trying to bring order back to the modern world. This is not a book for the philosophical novice, and even those familiar with language like epistemology and ontology will have to read Tyson carefully. At the same time, the thesis and the argument are worth the work.

Tyson’s basic thesis is that “being, knowing, and believing always have their meanings in relation to each other.” (7) Unfortunately, the category of being has largely been ejected from the cultural imagination. This is part of what makes Tyson a challenge to read: He is resurrecting concepts and speaking in terms that are foreign to the way contemporary Western culture is constructed and communicates.

As the title indicates, Tyson is critical of modernity. Here he joins a line of other voices, which includes those who would like to return to some sort of pre-medieval synthesis and those who think that even the misshapen constraints of modernity are too restrictive. Tyson deals less with the cultural impacts of modernity than he does with the philosophical roots of modernity.

The beginning of an answer to what ails modernity, according to Tyson, is restoring the concept of ontology (the study of being) to the cultural imagination and then bringing being, wisdom, and truth back together in conversation. This process begins with the reconstruction of basic cultural assumptions, which begins by recognizing one’s hidden preconceptions and then trying to reconcile them with another set. The challenge is real.

One huge challenge Tyson identifies is that cultural assumptions are often masked, even (or perhaps especially) for those who specialize in pointing out the assumptions of others. He writes, “When modern theological thinking tries to be ‘scientific’ in modern terms––appealing to notions of objective proof and instrumental effectiveness––it is entirely unrelated to ancient theology. This is as true of ‘liberal’ theology as it is of ‘fundamentalist’ theology in modernity.” (37)

Tyson’s point here will be shocking to some, but he is far from the first to note that many fundamentalists have adopted basically modern approaches to theology. This has sometimes resulted in sub-orthodox formulations of doctrine, even among those most concerned with orthodoxy. The reductionistic tendency of our culture shapes us unless we consistently seek to challenge them, interrogating them to evaluate their integrity. That interrogation must not be done skeptically, with the cynicism entailed in the approach of the college sophomore, but honestly with a repeated attempt to ask “Is this right?” or “What am I missing?”

Tyson’s work fits well into the conversation with individuals like Zygmunt Bauman, Charles Taylor, and others. Tyson comes at the questions from a more directly philosophical angle, rather than the cultural or sociological angle of others. Everyone doing cultural analysis of modernity’s failings is engaged in philosophy, but Tyson’s analysis ventures little beyond philosophy.

De-fragmenting Modernity is a worthwhile volume for those philosophically minded and willing to invest some energy into careful reading. As we continue to try to restore a deeper sense of reality in our lives, including among our circles of friends and family, the foundational work Tyson is doing can be a source of conversation and discovery.

De-Fragmenting Modernity: Reintegrating Knowledge with Wisdom, Belief with Truth, and Reality with Being

By Tyson, Paul

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A New Look into the Crisis of Epistemology - Untrustworthy - A Review

How do we know what we know? What criteria do we use to determine what is true? When sources of information conflict, how do we come to a resolution?

Epistemology––the way that we know things––is among greatest challenges of our day.

There is no question that humanity’s greatest need is the gospel, but epistemology is a significant barrier to communicating the gospel and for others to receive the gospel message.

The epistemological crisis is not an “out there” problem in the world, as we were told for years with postmodernism. We have an epistemology crisis in the church. And not just “those liberals” who deny the resurrection, affirm sexual revisionism, or whatever. The crisis provides different symptoms on the left, the right, and in the center (doctrinally speaking), but it is no less severe.

Bonnie Kristian is a journalist who writes for The Week, a news digest magazine that summarizes current events from around the world. She has also been a columnist for Christianity Today.

In her recent book, Untrustworthy, Kristian tackles the crisis on knowledge in US Christianity. She begins by outlining the problem, digs into its various instantiations, and concludes by proposing some basic steps to begin to iron out solutions. This is an introductory volume with plenty of illustrations to keep the reader engaged in a discussion about an important topic.

The first step to dealing with any problem is to recognize there is a problem. When epistemology is the issue, it is difficult for people to identify for themselves. As David Foster Wallace pointed out in his well-known commencement address, “This is Water,” we make a million assumptions about the world and usually cannot see our own weaknesses and failures.

For cultural progressives, who tend to congregate on the political left, the epistemological flaws may include basic assumptions about truth—that truth is dependent upon one’s experience and identity. (Chapter 7) It may include conspiracy theories that a cabal of old, rich, white men have rigged the economy against a whole host of oppressed minorities. It includes assumptions that anyone who does not affirm the appropriate culturally progressive theories of humanity––even ones that would have earned a horse laugh a decade ago––without question is somehow a knuckle-dragging neanderthal.

For those on the political right––I will not call them conservatives, because they usually are not––there are insidious conspiracy theories about the “deep state,” child trafficking rings, and pending arrest of specific political figures. Even those that have not fallen into the deep well of QAnon nonsense have probably seen, heard, or been impacted by adjacent conspiracy theories. The mantra “Do your own research” has been used to invalidate any perspective that does not accord with the starting opinions of the “independent thinking” individual who is generally getting his or her research threaded together by a Reddit poster or a YouTuber. (Chapter 5)

The epistemological crisis is not a problem that was caused by people minding their own business.  It hasn’t even really been caused by social media or the traditional media, per se. (Chapter 2) Twenty-four-hour cable news has certainly accelerated the problem. Ideological isolation of many individuals—especially journalists and experts—has contributed to the epistemological crisis. Decades of intentional erosion of a belief in an external, objective truth (even if we can’t perfectly describe it) has added fuel to the fire. This is a whole culture problem that has many contributors. Anyone who tries to blame just one group or medium of communication is probably selling something.

Kristian’s analysis does not cover every possible contributing factor to the epistemological crisis. She tends to focus on non-academic elements of epistemology. This is understandable, because there is a lot of navel gazing that goes on among philosophers about what it takes to form justified true beliefs (see Alvin Plantinga’s book, Knowledge and Christian Belief for a reasonably accessible intro). She also does not propose simple solutions, which is good, because there are no simple solutions. However, Kristian’s Untrustworthy does provide a reasonable introduction to the philosophy of knowledge for someone for whom “epistemology” might as well be a term for a vestigial gland in New Zealand marsupials.

One potential weakness of Untrustworthy is that it seems to punch right more than it punches left. This makes sense, for a least two reasons. First, Kristian has joined an Anabaptist sect (she says because of their pacifism), which tend to be more doctrinally conservative. Therefore, Kristian is more concerned about the problems on the “Right” side of the Christian spectrum. Second, the epistemological crisis among evangelicals and fundamentalists comes to the cocktail party in overalls, while the progressives bring their epistemological distortions in tuxedos laced with hallucinogens. Twisted metaphor aside, it is often much easier to identify the problems of QAnon and adjacent theories than it is the slippery arguments for progressive relativism. (The fact that many can’t seem to differentiate between trying to not be overtly racist and actual Critical Race Theory tends to support that fact.)

What Kristian makes clear is that the epistemological crisis of our day is not just due to “liberals” or “progressives” that can’t tell the difference between a biological male and female. The world has become liquid for those that identify as conservatives and progressives. Some of the people who have ardently argued against postmodern epistemology have fallen into the snare of it. Kristian’s book helps to show the reader immersed in the river of Western culture what water is. Perhaps by recognizing the problem we can begin to take steps to shore up the foundations of knowledge and rebuild a stronger society.

Untrustworthy: The Knowledge Crisis Breaking Our Brains, Polluting Our Politics, and Corrupting Christian Community

By Kristian, Bonnie

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NOTE: I was provided an advanced reader copy of this volume by the publisher with no expectation of a positive review.

Knowledge and Christian Belief - A Review

Is being a Christian at all intellectually defensible?

To many Christians, this seems like an obvious answer. Especially those who have been taught to begin debates with an assertion, “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’”

That quote, which opens Psalm 14, is no doubt true. However, it is not helpful and often falls short of the mark. First, fool is a moral category in Scripture, not “doofus” or “idiot” as we might think in our own culture. Second, the logic doesn’t flow the way the Christian would like. A fool may say there is no God, but it does not follow that someone who says there is no God is a fool. At least, it does not follow by that statement alone.

Setting that digression aside, it is more apt to this discussion to note that there are many atheists and agnostics that would argue that it is foolish to believe in God, or at least to have any confidence that there is a God. Some have gone as far as to say that it is morally repugnant to believe in God. The arguments along those lines generally flow from the problem of evil, which was really aptly stated by Epicurus and oft repeated since then: If there is a God in the world and there is evil in the world, then that God must be evil, since an omniscient, omnipotent God (the sort of God that matters) would stop evil. It’s been a knotty problem for generations of Christian philosophers.

Unfortunately, some Christians do a pretty poor job of dealing with the problem of evil, especially those Christians equipped with a semester of philosophy.

Alvin Plantinga remains one of the foremost Christian philosophers. He was a winsome and potent advocate for orthodox Christianity and his arguments take on all challengers. His book, Knowledge and Christian Belief is an example of the quality of work he does and he makes his arguments accessible to well read individuals, who may not have extensive backgrounds in philosophy.

Plantinga’s style of argument is to take the strongest objections to his position, state them as strongly as possible, and then topple them like a house of cards.

This may sound like an exaggeration, but his succinct volume takes on some of the most significant defeaters to the Christian faith and demonstrates pretty clearly that not only is faith in Christ possible, it’s a good explanation for the world as it is.

One of the surprising ways that Plantinga makes this argument is to take on the challenge that Christians cannot have warranted belief for God. He states the objection about as well as it can be and then shows why the strength of those objections depends on the assumption the Christianity is false. In fact, if one does not make that assumption, then the better conclusion (especially given the sense of transcendence) is that Christianity is, more probably than not, true. (Absolute certainty in this logical sense is not the primary goal or a likely outcome of this sort of argument.)

At the end of the volume, Plantinga takes on the major challenges of historical biblical criticism, pluralism, and evil. The chapter on historical biblical criticism is worth the cost of the book, as Plantinga shows that neither of the two main approaches to historical biblical criticism offer much of a challenge to traditional Christianity, because the assumptions that underly the methodology are fundamentally foreign to the system it is challenging, and thus incapable of actually undermining the faith it intends to undermine. Plantinga concludes, “The traditional Christian can rest easy with the claims of HBC [Historical Biblical Criticism]; she need feel no obligation, intellectual or otherwise, to modify her belief in the light of its claims and alleged results.” (106)

The argumentation leading to that conclusion is tight. It is not the sort of gun-slinging, sloppy  argumentation that sometimes occurs on YouTube. Despite the fact that Knowledge and Christian Belief is a somewhat simplified version of a more academic work, the argument still requires great care in reading to follow it accurately. But the end result is an encouragement to believe Christianity as it has been passed on, without modification, and without a sense of intellectual inferiority.

There is no compromise intellectually in being a Christian, as Plantinga shows.

If there was a way to dial this down just a little more, this would be an amazing book to put into the hands of a high school senior, ready to head out in the world. As it is, a careful parent or friend with a little rereading could work through this slowly and patiently with a teen and give them a gift of confidence. Even if one cannot articulate everything that Plantinga argues, it is reassuring to know that the argument can be made.

Knowledge and Christian Belief is a short book, but it is a good one, especially for those seeking greater confidence in the basic truthfulness of Christianity. Alvin Plantinga makes a convincing case that one stands on solid ground when one holds to the faith once for all delivered to the saints.

Knowledge and Christian Belief

By Plantinga, Alvin

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Some thoughts on The Postmodern Condition

Postmodernism was the bogeyman of the late ‘90s and early 2000s among evangelicals and other conservatives. In much the same way that one’s response to Critical Race Theory (which has some connections with postmodernity) serves as a shibboleth for acceptability in trendy circles, postmodernism functioned as a way to be part of the cool kids (on either side).

There are now those that think that postmodernism is really just another form of modernity (perhaps further advanced along its trajectory), and thus never really existed as a distinct movement, but there was something that adherents and opponents felt was different from the general stream of modernity, which still deserves some attention. With that in mind, I picked up, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s book, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, to try to get a better understanding from the horse’s mouth, as it were.

Lyotard offers a definition in his introduction: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.”

In other words, Lyotard was arguing that modernity attempted to impose homogeneity on the world through metanarratives—high level explanations that were an attempt to make sense of everything. Postmodernity claims to recognize metanarratives as impositions from authorities that likely have little claim to correspondence to the truth.

At its best, postmodernity shakes the claims of modernistic empiricism, which leads to the apparent supremacy of “Science.” Postmodernity did not succeed in uprooting the religion of Scientism, as evidenced by the year of shaming that we “follow the Science” or “believe in the Science” or “listen to the Science.” In general, when someone puts a definite article in front of “Science” they are no longer talking about actual science, but about how they intend to try to browbeat you into doing what they want to. We are still very much living in an era where people believe that “Science” has or can produce a unified theory of everything. This despite Thomas Kuhn’s work in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which shows a truer picture of the way the scientific community develops metanarratives that evolve over time.

By Lyotard offers some helpful analysis beyond his definition of postmodernism. Though The Postmodern Condition was written in 1979, he predicted the information age with a surprising degree of prescience.

For example, he wrote,

“Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major—perhaps the major—stake in the worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control of access to and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor.”

There are obvious connections to information warfare, the psyops that are ongoing with bots on social media, election interference, etc. The fact that there are operatives from other nations whose primary goal is to stir up dissent and doubt among citizens of the United States is an illustration of Lyotard’s prediction.

Also, significantly for the concept of education and the role of the state, Lyotard anticipated the shifting role of the state with regard to education:

“The mercantilization of knowledge is bound to affect the privilege the nation-states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the production and distribution of learning. The notion that learning falls within the purview of the State, as the brain or mind of society, will become more and more outdated with the increasing strength of the opposing principle, according to which society exists and progresses only if the messages circulating within it are rich and easy to decode. The ideology of communicational “transparence,” which goes hand in hand with the commercialization of knowledge, will begin to perceive the State as a factor of opacity and “noise.” It is from this point of view that the problem of the relationship between economic and State powers threatens to arise with a new urgency.”

It isn’t entirely a bad thing when the State is no longer perceived as “the brain or mind of society,” since the State has been significantly wrong about a number of life changing issues in the not-so-distant past. However, within Lyotard’s prediction is the anticipation of QAnon and similar conspiracy theories, which see a “Deep State” that is controlling the narrative. This has effectively made Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other outlets the de facto gatekeepers of truth, as congressional hearings and obnoxious overlays on social media posts frequently remind us.

It is interesting to read The Postmodern Condition at this point, to see how many of Lyotard’s anticipated realities have come true. As a description of reality, he is on the right track. He does little to help find a way to navigate through toward some better condition, but there is some value in the diagnosis.

How do We Know? - A Review

One of the biggest needs in the church, especially among theologically conservative Christians, is a recovery of epistemology.

The problem is that that first statement alone will significantly limit the audience for a post like this or the sort of study that is needed to really help change the unhealthy approach to media and Bible study by many Christians.

Epistemology is the study of how we know things. It’s one of those words that until you read it a bunch of times in different settings and hear a number of people defining and explaining it, you will often have a hard time grasping what it really means.

How do we know things? Well, we just do, right? Not exactly.

In certain crowds, if I ask “How do we know?” I am likely to be told that we read the Bible. “God said it, I believe it, that settles it.” I’ve seen more than a few bumper stickers to that effect.

That may be a comforting way to end a discussion for some, but how do we know that the Bible’s statements are true? What do we do with phenomena about which the Bible does not speak? In other words, even if I accept the Bible as absolutely trustworthy in everything it addresses, how do I live in a world that is culturally unlike the Bible.

Additionally, how do I know that my reading of the Bible’s statements is correct? Exposure to individuals from other cultures will quickly reveal that different people perceive different symbols different ways. How can I know that I know what is true in the Bible is really true?

That last question reveals how strange the question can get really quickly. It’s easier to jump back to “common sense” where we simply accept the received wisdom from epistemic authorities—the people or institutions we trust—than ask this slippery question.

But what happens when manipulative predators realize that folks are going to take their word for it? And what happens when there are so many entities posing as epistemic authorities because of the information age that anyone can jump on YouTube and present themselves as an authority that anyone can find and some folks will believe?

You get the right epistemic mess that we are in, with conspiracy theories flying around a mile a minute, distrust in any group that does not agree with you or your in-group, and a failure to recognize that even with an authoritative text like the Bible, a reader can bring so many presuppositions to the table that he or she can entirely misread the message. It’s a pretty bleak situation.

However, there is hope. First, because we have a living and loving God who inspired the Bible and illuminates it, so that the person of the Holy Spirit will continue to work on the minds and hearts of those who are honest in their pursuit of holiness. Second, there is hope because of books like How Do We Know? An Introduction to Epistemology, which was just released as a second edition, by Jamie Dew and Mark Foreman.

How Do We Know? is an attempt to provide a resource on a tricky subject that does not require a background in philosophy to understand. The authors come at the problem head on in the first pages of the series introduction: “Many people today have embraced, often without realizing it, an approach to knowing reality that undermines their ever coming to truly understand it.”

The book asks a series of questions in each of its chapters:

What is epistemology? What is knowledge? Where does knowledge come from? What is truth, and how do we find it? What are inferences, and how do they work? What do we perceive? Do we need justification? [of belief, not soteriology] Can we be objective in our view of the world? What is virtue epistemology? Do we have revelation? How certain can we be?

That is a lot of questions for a very short book. In about 150 pages, the authors try to provide reasonable answers to each one of those difficult, but very important questions. They do quite well.

How Do We Know? is a good place to start in getting a foothold in what I believe to be one of the most important topics for our day. There are obviously some side, tribal battles that pop up and might be cause for disagreement among more experienced theologians and philosophers. For example, some Reformed individuals who have been exposed to presuppositionalism may find points of disagreement. However, on balance, the authors are fair in their dealing with the tribal disagreements within Christian philosophy. As a result, the 150-pages of this book may be more helpful to a beginner than the 400-page tome that is John Frame’s The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, for example. Dew and Foreman wrote an introduction with all of its blessings and limitations. But it is a good introduction.

Even though this is the sort of book that is written specifically for those that have little background in philosophy, it requires either some scaffolding through a class or a decent education. This would make for an excellent undergraduate text, a useful volume for a small-group study with reasonably educated lay people—especially those who read. This is a book that would be well-placed withing a high school homeschool curriculum, particularly if a parent was available to help work through some of the hairy edges of the concepts. In other words, this is an accessible book, but the topic is very abstract and sometimes help is needed. Dew and Foreman have done about as well as can be done with an exceptionally important, but extremely difficult field of study.

One can hope that How Do We Know? gets a wide readership beyond academic settings. The church in general, and evangelical churches specifically, have a significant crisis of knowing, trust, and critical thinking on their hands. The answer is not more five-minute YouTube clips, but basic discipleship and training in how to process information, which is exactly what How Do We Know? provides.

How Do We Know? (Questions in Christian Philosophy)

By Dew Jr., James K., Foreman, Mark W.

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NOTE: I received a gratis copy of this volume from the publisher with no expectation of a positive review.

Conspiracy Theories - A Review

In 2016, a conspiracy theory about a ring of pedophiles led to Edgar Madison Welch storming a pizza parlor with a semi-automatic rifle to break things up. Welch was a volunteer fireman and an ordinary member of his local church. An otherwise normal, civic-minded citizen, Welch had become convinced that children were actively being trafficked by the owner of the restaurant. The so-called Pizzagate conspiracy theory had been spread online by right-wing political advocates due to the owner’s support for Hillary Clinton during her 2016 campaign. The Pizzagate conspiracy theory is one of many ideas cultivated on the political right and left that influence the way people see the world.

Conspiracy theories sprout up around struggles for power, whether in civil or denominational politics, and can lead to destructive responses. In his recent book, Conspiracy Theories: A Primer, Joseph Uscinski argues, “Conspiracy theories posit a powerful enemy whose goals may pose an existential threat to humanity. It is therefore reasonable to expect that such theories would motivate believers to take action.” (p. 5)

Most conspiracy theories are harmless, but some contribute to violent action against opposing groups. In the modern wilderness of the Internet Age, we cannot afford to simply ignore conspiracy theories because they can tear social structures apart.

Nature of Conspiracy Theories

Sometimes “conspiracy theory” is used as an epithet for contested interpretations of data to avoid considering opposing views fairly, but Uscinski offers a helpful definition: “Conspiracy theory is an explanation of past, present, or future events or circumstances that cites, as the primary cause, a conspiracy. . . . Conspiracy theories are inherently political. Conspiracy theories are accusatory ideas that could either be true or false, and they contradict the proclamations of epistemological authorities, assuming such proclamations exist.” (p. 23)

Although it is common to dismiss conspiracy theories as absurdly irrational, Uscinski justly points out that some conspiracy theories turn out to be true. Tobacco companies obscured evidence of the harms of smoking; corporations in Silicon Valley colluded to reduce the wages of engineers; the federal government used African-Americans as subjects for human experimentation in Tuskegee. There are real conspiracies that deserve investigation and exposure.

Many conspiracy theories are non-falsifiable. In other words, any evidence for or against the theory is used to strengthen it, never to undermine it. Uscinski writes, “For the conspiracy theorist, the fact that we don’t have good evidence of a conspiracy only shows that the conspirators are good at covering their tracks. . . . But because of their non-falsifiability, conspiracy theories should not be thought of as true or false, but rather as more or less likely to be true.” (p. 27) At some point, there is no evidence that will undermine the confidence in a firmly held conspiracy theory, since the denial of a conspirator is only further evidence of the conspiracy.

Epistemological Authorities

Both tribalism and the lack of epistemological authorities contribute to the increasing number of conspiracy theories. According to Uscinski, “An appropriate epistemological authority . . . is one that is trained to assess knowledge claims in a relevant area and draw conclusions from valid data using recognized methods in an unbiased way.” (p. 23) There are few commonly trusted stewards of truth and knowledge in our culture. When avoidance of bias is no longer considered a necessary goal for media outlets, academic researchers and community leaders, the groundwork is laid for propagation of conspiracy theories: everyone believes what is right in their own eyes.

Real conspiracies have contributed to the lack of epistemological authorities. For example. perverse incentives in the academy––supposed to be the last bastion of unbiased reasoning––shape the research individuals do, the language they use to report their findings, and even what results are accepted through the peer review process. For example, in Galileo’s Middle Finger, Alice Dreger details the experience of several progressive researchers who were mercilessly attacked by other progressives for producing results that did not support the accepted consensus. Such cases of overt bias undermine the authority of institutions and processes that can quell conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy Theories and Political Power

Recently the QAnon conspiracy theories have spread on the political right including among some theologically conservative Christians. Conspiracy theories grow most quickly among the highly partisan, because the theories generally involve some evil being perpetuated by one’s opponents who are seeking power to subvert the common good. As political polarization has increased conspiracy theories have become a significant part of political campaigns. For example, Bernie Sanders actively campaigned on the conspiracy theory that the top “1%” richest people in the United States have “rigged” the economy. During his campaign for the 2016 election, President Trump promoted the conspiracy theory that Ted Cruz’s father helped assassinate JFK.

A common trope is that conspiracy theories are much more common on the political right than the left. Instead, Uscinski argues the conspiracy theories of the right and left are different in content, but roughly equal in volume and tenacity. He notes, “There is nothing inherent in Republicanism, conservatism, or right-wing politics that makes people more conspiratorial in their outlook.” (p. 13)

Uscinski observes that the increase in tribalism is tending to increase the prevalence of conspiracy theories. Humans are more likely to believe their ideological opponents are working to subvert society. Tribalism also limits the epistemological authorities that have reach across the increasing divide between right and left, especially when some institutions that used to function in that capacity have abandoned the quest for neutrality.

A Response

Uscinski’s primer on conspiracy theories is informative but it lacks concrete solutions. In the final paragraph of the book he recommends teaching critical thinking, increasing political transparency, and avoiding electing politicians that overtly promote conspiracy theories. These are all good things and worth considering, but the book leaves readers to do their own research.

A reader might be tempted to shake her head at the inevitability of an ongoing increase of conspiracy theories. Some posit that the way that people interact with information on the internet has made conspiracy theories. The “other side” is guaranteed to spread conspiracy theories, so it seems appropriate to fight fire with fire. Some might think that resisting conspiracy thinking and pushing back on conspiracy theories is not worth the effort.

Despite the difficulties, resisting the spread of conspiracy theories is worthwhile. Uscinski argues that conspiracy theories are destroying our society and political processes: “One cannot make meaningful decisions in a democracy awash in conspiracy theories, and one cannot compromise with opponents if one believes those opponents are engaged in a vast conspiracy. Despite whatever electoral advantages come from conspiracy theory politics, there is a much larger price to pay.” (119) Similarly, it is nearly impossible to cooperate for global missions when members of a denomination are adamant in attacking their own institutions with non-falsifiable conspiracy theories.

But there is nothing new under the sun. Paul warns Timothy of “certain persons, by swerving from these, have wandered away into vain discussion, desiring to be teachers of the law, without understanding either what they are saying or the things about which they make confident assertions.” (1 Tim 1:6-7) The content and topics may have changed, but the problem still remains.

For Christians, it would prove good for us to turn to the epistemological authority of Scripture, in which Paul gives good advice for breaking the chain of conspiracy thinking:

“Finally, brother, whatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is just, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is commendable, if there is any excellence, if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things. What you have learned and received and heard and seen in me––practice these things, and the God of peace will be with you.” (Phil 4:8–9)

Conspiracy Theories: A Primer

By Uscinski, Joseph E.

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NOTE: I received a gratis copy of this volume from the publisher with no expectation of a positive review.

The Madness of Crowds - A Review

I was on a major university campus recently and was struck first by the affluence that surrounded me. Beyond the significant tuition payments and nice dorm buildings, there were very few “beater” cars on display. Most of the vehicles looked fairly new—something radically different than the way college kids used to drive. The university is huge, so it is really a city within a city, and both of those cities are affluent. There was a rarefied air of wealth and sophistication.

More significantly there were posters, fliers, and bumper stickers that declared opposition to “colonization,” support of various identities, and a host of other positions that reside somewhere on the left-wing of global politics.

To be clear, racism remains a significant issue in our world and must be combated. There are still misogynists and cads who use their power to abuse and undermine women. There are bullies that pick on anyone who doesn’t fit in with certain norms and attempt to demonize them.

At the same time, there are significant points where the movements that are calling for “justice” along different lines of gender, race, and identity seem to make their arguments on indefensible and sometimes self-contradictory grounds. Though they profess to be concerned about others wielding power,they seem to be altogether too prepared to swing their own billy clubs, often figuratively and sometimes literally, in the name of their preferred positions. This extra-judicial enforcement of their ideas and positions seems to undermine the nature of justice as it has been understood in most civilizations of which we have record.

Douglas Murray’s book, The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity, takes a closer look at the various neo-Marxist movements to examine their foundations and abuses. Murray stands on what would be described the “conservative” side of many of these debates, since he indicates a belief in truth that should be pursued apart from one’s self-interest. At the same time, Murray is himself an openly gay atheist. This means that he certainly does not agree with many social conservatives on issues like the redefinition of marriage, the morality of same-sex erotic relationships, and the existence of God. This makes his critique of the various identity movements intriguing and, perhaps, more powerful.

Summary

As a gay man, Murray begins with a critique of the portion of that portion of the left’s culture war. While he is openly in support of recent inventions like the Obergefell decision that arbitrarily redefined marriage, he is careful to note that within the last decade, there were multiple gay-rights organizations, including the Stonewall organization, that opposed gay marriage. A big portion of his argument here is that, although he thinks the changes are largely good, it might be more reasonable to expect people who hold to millennia-old positions on sexual morality to take a while to come around to an affirmation of a newly invented concept.

In the second content chapter, Murray examines the current presentation of the feminist movement. His point in this chapter is that the movement is largely contradictory and puts everyone in a nearly impossible situation. There are obvious statistically significant differences between men and women in general, but to note those things publicly is, for some, a high crime. Attempts to undermine bias have created processes that necessarily bias organizations and culture in ways that tend to cut the feed from under those they are intended to help. In addition, the identity-oriented science arguments of feminism (e.g., there are no fundamental differences between men and women based on genetics) come into direct opposition with the theories favored by many in the various gay movements (e.g., there are fundamental differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals based on genetics), which creates issues. The issue becomes more epistemological than political at some point.

The third content chapter wrestles with the racial justice movement, which in its best aspects has led to awareness of systemic wrongs and worked to correct them. On the other hand, the same movement has also sought to make race (one of) the most important aspects of a human’s essence and thus made it more possible for systemic bias to continue or grow. In some cases, the result has been a new systemic bias against a different set of minorities, as has been evidenced by Harvard’s discrimination against Asians in admissions. This also puts people in weird spots, so that whites have to self-deprecate to speak against racism or be perceived as colonizers. The struggle in many cases seems to be more about power than truth.

The final content chapter discusses the transgender movement. Murray expresses sympathy with individuals who legitimately struggle with a sense of discomfort with their bodies and believe they would be more satisfied presenting as the opposite sex. At the same time, he notes that the movement for trans-rights has short-circuited the processes that might guard someone from making irreversible, life-altering decisions without considering that there might be another possible cause or solution. He discusses multiple examples where people who express minimal discomfort with their sex are quickly stepped down the road toward chemical and surgical transition, without a thorough vetting. Again, there are epistemological questions about the nature of truth and whether even asking questions (“Is your feeling true and lasting?”) is perceived as harmful.

Between each of these chapters is an interlude that explores some of the underlying causes and further consequences of this rapid epistemological shift. Murray discusses the Marxist foundations of the movement, which serves to continually enhance human discomfort by undermining power structures. He notes the impact of tech, with rapid communication, the inability to have a private conversation, and the work of Google’s search manipulations to present an alternate reality. Finally, he includes a section on one of the worst aspects of these movements, which is that there is no place or possibility of forgiveness. Statements that were uncontroversial a decade ago can now be used to destroy people who are deemed undesirable. Context matters little, as long as the right things are opposed violently and openly.

Analysis and Conclusion

Murray’s book is helpful in many ways. He points to the unsustainability of much of what passes for the social justice movement. The quest for destruction of power necessarily creates an oppressive power that will likely be as bad or worse a master.

The danger of Murray’s book is that his examples of gross abuses of various identity movements to pursue hatred and destruction of the innocent may lead some to believe that we need only resist those movements. That is most likely to occur among those who don’t actually read the book, or do so only cursorily. Murray takes concerns for the persecution of gay and trans individuals seriously, but notes that the movements that claim to support them are destroying the possibility of their being accepted or the society that will be able to accept them. In attempting to shift the Overton window, these groups may rip the house off its foundations, leaving us all cold and miserable in the winter storms.

The value of this book is that it looks beyond the gross abuses of violence and power by the various identity movements to interrogate the intellectual basis and question the logical conclusions. The result is an exposé that is illuminating, even if readers do not agree with all of Murray’s conclusions. There are a few points where Murray seems to drift a bit into outrage porn, but on the whole, he takes a fairly balanced view and calmly makes his arguments. This book, of course, is likely to be panned as violent oppression by many within the various justice movements simply because it questions some of the foundations and outcomes of their movement. However, it would benefit many on the left and the right to read the book and consider their own positions.

The Madness of Crowds: Gender, Race and Identity

By Murray, Douglas

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NOTE: I received a gratis copy of this volume with no expectation of a positive review.